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BRINGING MORE FINALITY TO FINALITY:
CONDITIONAL CONSENT JUDGMENTS AND
APPELLATE REVIEW
THOMAS A. ENGELHARDT†
INTRODUCTION
Each year, the Supreme Court of the United States typically
denies certiorari in over 9,000 cases.1
Denying nearly
ninety-nine percent of certiorari petitions is essential to the
Court’s sustainability, considering its extremely limited
resources.2 Despite the necessity of denying certiorari in an
overwhelming majority of cases, a particular denial in 1980
frustrated Justice Harry Blackmun. The case was Amstar Corp.
v. Southern Pacific Transport Co. of Texas & Louisiana.3
The petitioner in Amstar was a sugar refiner.4 After its
sugar was damaged during delivery, Amstar sued Southern
Pacific Transport (“Southern Pacific”), a common carrier.5
Although Southern Pacific initially denied liability, the real issue
was the correct measure of damages.6 Amstar sought damages
more than fifteen times higher than what Southern Pacific
believed it might be liable for.7
After Southern Pacific moved for partial summary judgment
solely on the issue of damages, the district court granted the
motion in Southern Pacific’s favor.8 With the quantum of
damages determined to be the much lower of the disputed
†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., valedictorian, 2015,
St. John’s University School of Law; B.S., summa cum laude, 2012, Marist College.
Thank you to Professor John Hennigan for his invaluable guidance and to my
parents for their enduring love and support.
1
Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supreme
court.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
2
Id.
3
449 U.S. 924 (1980).
4
Id. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 924–25.
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amounts, only the issue of liability remained in the case.9 The
partial summary judgment was, of course, interlocutory and not
yet appealable.10
During a pretrial conference, the parties agreed to a
stipulation of facts and submitted a request to the court to enter
a “consent judgment”11 on the parties’ terms.12 The parties
stipulated that Southern Pacific was liable and that it would pay
the damages determined by the court’s partial summary
judgment ruling.13 The parties agreed, however, that Amstar
could appeal the determination of damages.14 The court entered
a consent judgment on the parties’ stipulation and included the
following language: “This judgment is rendered in recognition of
the reservation by the plaintiff of its right to prosecute an
appeal . . . in connection with this judgment and in connection
with the partial summary judgment rendered on March 14,
1979.”15
Amstar made a timely appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.16 After both sides devoted their
briefs solely to the issue of damages, the court determined that
“the fact that both parties freely consented to the entry of a final
judgment precludes an appeal from it.”17 The Supreme Court
subsequently denied Amstar’s petition for certiorari.18
In his dissent to the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice
Blackmun noted that there was a clear dispute as to the measure
of damages, and that appeal was not precluded by the parties’
stipulation to a consent judgment.19 He argued that a review of

9

Id. at 925.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–92 (2012).
11
As discussed later, a consent judgment is a judgment entered by a court based
upon settlement terms negotiated and agreed to by the parties. E. H. Schopler,
Annotation, Right to Appellate Review of Consent Judgment, 69 A.L.R.2d 755, § 2
(1960).
12
Amstar, 449 U.S. at 925 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 925–26 (quoting Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 607
F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
18
Id. at 924.
19
Id. at 926. Justice Blackmun quoted a 1928 Supreme Court decision to
support the notion that appeal is not precluded by the parties entering into a
consent judgment:
10

FINAL_ENGELHARDT

2015]

BRINGING MORE FINALITY TO FINALITY

10/7/2015 7:14 PM

295

the merits of the partial summary judgment should not be
foreclosed by an unnecessarily “strict concept of consent and
acceptance in the face of facts that the asserted consent was
specifically limited and that petitioner consistently and
persistently disclaimed full settlement of the lawsuit.”20 Justice
Blackmun concluded his dissent by stating that although the
amount of damages at issue may not have been exceptionally
large, the Court was mistaken in denying review “in a case where
the principle is important.”21
The test of time has validated Justice Blackmun’s foresight.
Over thirty years after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Amstar, a live controversy remains with respect to the
appealability of consent judgments. The persistent issue is
whether a party forfeits the right to appeal by stipulating to
terms and entry of judgment on those terms, while reserving the
right to appeal certain matters in the case. Further, the
controversy has expanded to involve not only whether certain
rulings in a case may be appealed from a consent judgment, but
also whether certain voluntarily dismissed claims may “spring
back to life” upon reversal of an adverse ruling.22
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided over
the appealability of conditional consent judgments in which
judgments entered with the parties’ consent are conditioned on
affirmance of an issue on appeal.23 Uniform precedent would
benefit parties when negotiating stipulations at the trial level.
Instances, such as in Amstar—where the parties stipulated to a
The decree sought to be vacated was entered with the defendants' consent.
Under the English practice a consent decree could not be set aside by
appeal or bill of review, except in case of clerical error . . . . In this Court a
somewhat more liberal rule has prevailed. Decrees entered by consent have
been reviewed upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim of lack
of actual consent to the decree as entered . . . .
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311,
323–24 (1928)).
20
Id. at 927.
21
Id.
22
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting
that upon reversal and remand, petitioner could have sought further recovery as
part of a class).
23
Compare LaForest v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 569 F.3d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2009)
(stating that a party to a consent judgment may reserve a right to appeal as long as
it does so unequivocally), with Jones v. Merck & Co. (In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.),
422 F. App’x. 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (stating that a party that
consents to the entry of a final judgment is precluded from bringing an appeal).
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consent judgment and prepared for appeal by solely briefing the
issue of damages, just to have the court deny the appeal—are a
waste of time and resources for litigants. Looking at past and
present case law, as well as policy factors, this Note argues
generally for a standard that allows a party to secure appeal of
adverse prior rulings by stipulating to a consent judgment that
explicitly reserves a right to appeal. More specifically, this Note
argues that, in stipulating to a consent judgment that reserves a
right to appeal, a party may dismiss a claim without prejudice on
condition that the claim may be reasserted only if an adverse
ruling is reversed on appeal. If the challenged district court
ruling is affirmed on appeal, the dismissal becomes binding and
the claim may not be reasserted.
Part I provides background on finality, including an
overview of the final judgment rule and other statutory grants of
appellate jurisdiction. Part I then discusses consent judgments,
including conditional consent judgments. Part II examines the
circuit splits with respect to issues of finality and the
appealability of consent judgments that reserve a right to appeal.
Part III presents arguments for and against strict interpretation
and application of the finality requirement regarding consent
judgments. Part IV argues for resolving the controversy by
adopting a standard by which appellate courts uniformly
recognize a consent judgment’s reservation of a right to appeal
certain adverse rulings. This Note concludes by explaining how
this standard achieves the goals of the federal judicial system,
such as judicial economy and fairness to parties.
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OVERVIEW: FINALITY; CONSENT JUDGMENTS

A.

Background on Finality

1.

Overview of Appellate Jurisdiction

As inferior courts created by Congress, the circuit courts
possess only such jurisdiction as Congress confers by statute.24
28 U.S.C. § 1291 is the circuit courts’ primary basis for
jurisdiction, conferring “jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States.”25 The
requirement of a final judgment is called the “final-judgment
rule.”26 A final judgment “ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”27 To
secure appellate jurisdiction, the decision subject to appeal must
be characterized as “final,” unless one of the narrow alternative
statutory bases applies.28
The primary justification for such a narrow scope of
appellate jurisdiction is to protect the relationship between trial
and appellate courts—a relationship that is fundamental to our
legal system.29 The timing for bringing appeals is affected by two
important aspects of the relationship between the trial and
appellate courts. The first is the trial court’s obligation of fact

24
See 2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 3:123 (2015). Chief Justice
Warren summarized the courts of appeals’ jurisdictional nature in the following way:
It is axiomatic, as a matter of history as well as doctrine, that the existence
of appellate jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a given type of case
is dependent upon authority expressly conferred by statute. And since the
jurisdictional statutes prevailing at any given time are so much a product
of the whole history of both growth and limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction since the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, they have always been
interpreted in the light of that history and of the axiom that clear statutory
mandate must exist to found jurisdiction.
Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957). A court shall not exercise
jurisdiction over non-final decisions and is also obliged to raise the question of
jurisdiction sua sponte. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (“Subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in
doubt.”).
25
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). This provision provides an exception for when direct
review may be granted by the Supreme Court. Id.
26
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (10th ed. 2014).
27
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
28
15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3905 (2d ed. 2015).
29
Id. § 3907 (noting the final judgment rule seeks to maintain “the capacities
and performance of trial courts”).
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finding and applying legal standards to those facts.30 The next is
the wide discretion granted to a trial court in carrying out and
governing procedural matters, which appellate courts normally
defer to the trial court judge.31 These preliminary
responsibilities—fact finding, applying legal standards, and
ruling on procedural matters—play a vital role in an appellate
court’s ability to accurately identify controlling legal questions.32
Aside from the final judgment provision of § 1291,
jurisdiction is primarily conferred on the circuit courts by the
interlocutory appeal provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1292,33 and
extraordinary writs authorized by the All Writs Act.34 With
respect to § 1292, the Supreme Court delineated a test for when
interlocutory appeal is appropriate in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.35 This test is known as the “collateral
order doctrine.”36 The requirements for securing “collateral order
appeal” typically include: (1) the disputed question be
conclusively determined by an order; (2) the appealed matter be
separate from—and collateral to—the merits; and (3) the matter
would effectively be unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.37
The collateral order doctrine is based on an expansion of
finality under § 1291; however, the Supreme Court has made
clear that in applying the collateral order doctrine, a court shall
“never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is
entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012) (concerning interlocutory decisions and permitting
review of certain interlocutory orders—most notably those involving preliminary
injunctive relief and questions certified by the district court and accepted by the
court of appeals).
34
Id. § 1651. This provision enables the circuit courts and other courts to “issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id. § 1651(a).
35
337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949).
36
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989).
37
4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 105 (2015); see also Henry v. Lake Charles
Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the three
common
requirements—that
an
order
be
conclusive,
separate,
and
unreviewable—are not so much “strict preconditions” but “guidelines in making the
pragmatic determination of whether to allow an order to be immediately appealed”).
31
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has been entered.”38 Despite the narrow scope of the collateral
order doctrine, its expansiveness provides precedent for further
flexibility with respect to the finality requirement.
In rarer cases, other statutes provide grounds for appellate
review,39 and on occasion, statutes provide for the certifying of a
question to a circuit court if the question fits a narrow category.40
Further, statutes provide for review of acts by independent
administrative officials or agencies within the executive branch.41
Finally, the circuit courts are granted jurisdiction by a rather
unusual statute in certain extremely rare cases that would
otherwise be brought before the Supreme Court.42
An important justification for limiting appeals to final
judgments, collateral orders, and narrow statutory categories is
that Congress—by providing for appeals in certain circumstances
and not in others—has made its intent to limit appellate
jurisdiction clear.43 Congress has made this intent clear as far
back as the Judiciary Act of 1789 when Congress specifically

38
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (governing bankruptcy appeals to the
circuit courts).
40
See, e.g., 52 U.S.C.A. § 30110 (West 2014) (originally enacted as Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), § 310) (providing that in a voter action
brought to determine the constitutionality of a provision of the act, or of a certain
section of Title 18, “The district court immediately shall certify all questions of
constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit
involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.”).
41
See Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 614 F.2d 1121,
1125 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review orders
rendered by administrative agencies is wholly dependent upon statute.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Noland v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 544 F.2d 333,
334 (8th Cir. 1976)).
42
See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2012). The statute covers cases that are on direct appeal
to the Supreme Court from a district court where a quorum of qualified justices
cannot be assembled. As a result, appeal is heard in the circuit court for the district
in which the case was initiated, and that circuit court may make a final decision.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3901.
43
The collateral order doctrine involves the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
§ 1292.
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rejected piecemeal appellate practice.44 Consequently, some
courts feel that appeals heard in other circumstances constitute a
run around congressional intent.45
2.

Orders Prior to Trial—Voluntary and Involuntary Dismissal

With some background on finality, it is appropriate to
analyze how finality is affected by pretrial orders.
The
involuntary dismissal of a claim or the granting of summary
judgment on an important issue may represent a loss of a vital
part of the case.46 Under those circumstances, the adversely
affected party may decide that it is not worth settling or pursuing
certain remaining claims to final judgment. In such a situation,
a means of achieving final disposition is through voluntary
dismissal of the remaining claims.47
In this scenario, finality has been recognized following
voluntary dismissals both with and without prejudice—although
a dismissal with prejudice is a surer route to a final judgment for
purposes of appeal.48
A final judgment—as mentioned
above—“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment.”49 Under these
circumstances, it is critical to preserve the right to appeal prior
involuntary dismissals or adverse rulings.50 Preserving the right
to appeal is important because those prior rulings created the
circumstances that prompted voluntary dismissal due to
futility.51
A safer tactic to preserve a right to appeal seems to be
inviting dismissal without prejudice in conjunction with a
conditional consent judgment.52 The stipulation upon which the
court enters the judgment should expressly reserve a right to
44

See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945).
See Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178–79 (1955) (“Section
22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . provided that appeals in civil actions could be
taken to the circuit courts only from final decrees and judgments.”).
46
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8.
47
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
48
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8; see also Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1976) (securing review
of a dismissed count by obtaining dismissal of the remaining three counts of a fourcount complaint without prejudice).
49
Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233.
50
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8.
51
See id.
52
See id.
45
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appeal any adverse rulings and reinstate the dismissed claim on
condition that those adverse rulings are reversed.53 A number of
courts, however, have refused to exercise appellate jurisdiction
following these stipulations fearing they “permit finality to be
manufactured too easily.”54
B.

Background on Consent Judgments

A consent judgment is a judgment entered by a court based
upon settlement terms negotiated and agreed to by the parties.55
This type of judgment is aimed at ending the litigation while
securing an enforceable judgment.56
The parties’ mutual
understanding and agreement with respect to the terms,
conditions, and amounts is required before the court will enter
judgment.57 Judges, of course, have discretion regarding whether
to enter judgment on the parties’ terms.58

53
Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 976–77 (9th Cir.
2008). A party may still face difficulty in an appellate court that strictly adheres to
finality. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 607 F.2d 1100,
1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (“Although the consent judgment contained a
recognition that the plaintiff wished to appeal the issue of the limitation of damages,
the fact that both parties freely consented to the entry of a final judgment precludes
an appeal from it.”).
54
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8. An important aspect of voluntarily
invited dismissal is whether a plaintiff is permitted to reassert the relinquished
claim. See id.
55
Schopler, supra note 11. “A consent judgment results from mutual
understanding and concerted action by the parties, as documented in a settlement
agreement or stipulation which is consented to and sanctioned by the court.” Robert
R. Zitko, The Appealability of Conditional Consent Judgments, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
241, 242 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
56
See Schopler, supra note 11.
57
Id. Consent judgments differ from judgments by default, judgments by
confession, and judgments upon an agreed statement of fact. Id. Judgments by
default differ in that they result from defendants either not having a defense or not
offering one. Id. Judgments by confession differ in that they are based upon acts by
defendants in which they acknowledge and admit that the plaintiff has a just and
rightful cause of action. Id. Judgments upon an agreed statement of facts differ in
that it is the court, rather than the parties, that makes the final determination with
respect to matters of fact. Id.
58
15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). An important factor considered by a court is whether
“the entry of such judgment is in the public interest.” Id. § 16(e)(1).
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Upon entering a consent judgment, a court retains subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.59 In fact, a court
may enforce a consent judgment by all means—legal and
equitable—available to it.60 Consequently, unlike with a private
settlement, parties do not have to file separate lawsuits each
time the agreement is violated.61
While a private settlement agreement may be relatively easy
to modify, courts usually do not modify consent judgments after
they are entered.62 Modification of the judgment will only be
granted when compliance with the judgment is made
substantially more onerous or illegal by changed factual or legal
conditions.63
Ordinarily, a consent judgment is not appealable on the
merits.64 While consent judgments may help resolve cases more
promptly and efficiently, some appellate courts are wary of
considering them final since they are entered with the consent of
both parties rather than after fully litigating all matters.65 Many
other courts will, however, permit appeal from a consent
judgment,66 which makes sense considering that a consent
judgment fits quite squarely into the category of final judgments.
Like a final judgment, a consent judgment “ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment”67 rather than non-final or interlocutory orders which
require further steps at the trial level to decide the case on the
merits.68
59

Frederic C. Tausend & David H. Binney, Consent Judgments, in 5 BUSINESS
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 50:20 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d
ed. 2013). Further, disputes are heard by a judge who is familiar, or at least should
be, with the case. In this respect, “consent judgments ensure compliance more
effectively than private settlements.” Id.
60
See Cook v. City of Chi., 192 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1999). These means
include sanctions for contempt. See Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 291
(2d Cir. 2008).
61
Tausend & Binney, supra note 59.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Schopler, supra note 11, § 3.
65
Zitko, supra note 55, at 244–45.
66
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S 311, 324 (“Decrees entered by consent
have been reviewed upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim of lack of
actual consent to the decree as entered . . . .”); see also Thompson v. Maxwell
Land-Grant & Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 451, 462 (1897) (noting that review has also been
granted based on a claim of fraud in the procurement of one party’s consent).
67
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
68
Zitko, supra note 55, at 247.
AND
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However, even when hearing an appeal from a consent
judgment, courts apply a “waiver of error” standard—a severely
restricted scope of appellate review.69 The rationale for such a
limited scope of review is that consent judgments are entered
with the consent of both parties and thus do not deserve the
same attention of valuable appellate resources as judgments that
are favorable to one party’s wishes and unfavorable to the
other’s.70 Generally, when applying a waiver of error standard,71
the court determines whether a purported error falls within the
waiver.72 With respect to a consent judgment, the court’s job is
made relatively easy since consent judgments by their nature
involve the parties’ consent to entry of final judgment.73 Thus,
most courts simply affirm consent judgments without
consideration of the merits, holding that a party waives a claim
of error by consenting to the entry of judgment.74 As a result,
consent judgments are subjected to a de facto rule of
non-appealability.75
Though there are exceptions to this general rule, the impact
of these exceptions is limited because they involve issues that are
separate from the substance of the trial court’s ruling.76 These

69

Id. at 247–48, 250.
See id. at 247. Part of the issue with this line of reasoning is that consent
judgments are often stipulated to because of circumstances presented following an
adverse pretrial ruling, such as a partial summary judgment. See, e.g., Amstar Corp.
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 449 U.S. 924, 925 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (entering a consent judgment following partial summary judgment in the
plaintiff’s favor on the issue of the appropriate measure of damages).
71
See Zitko, supra note 55, at 250. The seminal case regarding the waiver of
error standard of review for consent judgments is Swift & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 311 (1928). In Swift, the Court set out waiver of error as the standard of review
by citing the Supreme Court case United States v. Babbitt, 104 U.S. 767 (1881),
which used waiver of error as the scope of review of a consent judgment. See Swift,
276 U.S. at 327; Babbitt, 104 U.S. at 768. Despite never providing a clear rationale
for the standard, the Court did allude to the fact that under English practice,
consent judgments could only be overturned based on the finding of clerical error.
See Swift, 276 U.S. at 323–24.
72
Zitko, supra note 55, at 247.
73
See supra Part I.B (“The parties’ mutual understanding and agreement with
respect to the terms, conditions, and amounts is required before the court will enter
[a consent] judgment.”).
74
Zitko, supra note 55, at 247–48.
75
Id. at 248.
76
Schopler, supra note 11, § 3.
70
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established exceptions include claims of (a) lack of actual
consent,77 (b) fraud in the procurement of consent,78 (c) mistake,79
and (d) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.80
Despite the exceptions to the de facto rule of
non-appealability, an unconditional consent judgment presents
barriers to some litigants’ ultimate goals.81
Consequently,
litigants have sought to use an alternative procedural tactic in
which similar objectives are achieved yet a right to appeal is
preserved.82
Conditional consent judgments—which make
settlement terms conditional on affirmance of adverse
rulings—have emerged as a means of ending litigation while
reserving a right to appeal.83 Courts are divided over whether
appellate review is appropriate with respect to conditional
consent judgments.84 Issues of finality are the main reasons for

77
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928). An attorney’s failure
to inform the client as to the clients’ personal liability under the consent judgment
represents sufficient lack of authority to vacate the consent judgment. Zitko, supra
note 55, at 248.
78
Swift, 276 U.S. at 324.
79
Id. at 323–24.
80
Id. at 324. A party may, of course, challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any
point during the case and a court may raise the issue sua sponte. See Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Parties may not create
subject matter jurisdiction through stipulation or waiver. A court must—in addition
to jurisdiction over the subject matter—have jurisdiction over each party to the
consent judgment before it can issue such a judgment. Zitko, supra note 55, at 250.
81
For example, the waiver of error standard of appeal is not helpful to an
individual who wishes to settle after receiving an adverse pretrial ruling, but
believes she has a strong case on appeal to have the prior ruling reversed. See id. at
251–52. For this individual, the best situation would be settlement on condition that
the adverse judgment is reviewed on the merits and affirmed on appeal.
82
See, e.g., INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir.
1993) (entering of judgment by the court with the consent of both parties and
“without waiving the right of the defendant to appeal” a pretrial evidentiary ruling).
83
See Zitko, supra note 55, at 251–52. This includes conditional settlement of
damages based on the circumstances as they present themselves following adverse
pretrial rulings as well as conditional dismissal of certain claims that are futile
based on such adverse rulings.
84
Schopler, supra note 11, § 3.
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the split among authorities,85 as some view conditional
judgments as non-final because they are entered “for the express
purpose of facilitating an appeal.”86
II. NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY—CIRCUIT SPLITS
The appealability of consent judgments presents
longstanding and recurring issues that divide the circuit courts.87
One circuit split involves whether consent judgments that
expressly reserve a right to appeal are final judgments for
purposes of appeal. There are differing views concerning the
appealability of a consent judgment that provides for litigation to
continue at the trial level upon reversal and remand. The view
that appeal from such a consent judgment is proper is supported
by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.88 The view that appeal
from such a consent judgment is prohibited is supported by the
Fifth Circuit and a broad reading of a recent Eighth Circuit
holding.89
The Eighth Circuit joined the discussion in a manner that
added an additional wrinkle to the conflict. A second split now
involves how a conditional voluntary dismissal impacts finality.
One view, that a judgment is final notwithstanding a conditional

85
Id. § 4. Compare Clark v. Hous. Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 726 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that although consent judgments are ordinarily not appealable,
appellate jurisdiction and review is appropriate where a party’s intent to appeal is
expressly recognized in the stipulation of judgment), and Keefe v. Prudential Prop.
and Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that a party does not
waive the right to appeal upon entering a consent judgment when there is a clear
understanding and agreement that one of the parties will appeal a contested issue
decided at the district court level), with Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex.
& La., 607 F.2d 1100, 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (articulating that appeal
from a judgment freely consented to by both parties—even if the consent judgment
explicitly reserves one party’s right to appeal—is precluded).
86
Schopler, supra note 11, § 3.
87
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S.
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *1.
88
INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that a party to a consent judgment may appeal from that judgment if it
explicitly reserves the right to do so); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 798
F.2d 1372, 1376–77 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that there is no reason to frustrate the
intent of parties who reserve the right to appeal a consent judgment).
89
Amstar, 607 F.2d at 1100 (holding that appeal from a judgment freely
consented to by both parties is precluded); see Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705
F.3d 839, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2013) (denying appeal from a consent judgment that
explicitly reserved the plaintiff’s right to appeal).
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voluntary dismissal, is supported by the Second Circuit.90
Another view, that a conditional voluntary dismissal renders a
judgment non-final, is supported by the Eighth Circuit’s recent
holding.91
The Eighth Circuit confronted these issues of appealability
in Ruppert v. Principal Life Insurance Co.92
The consent
judgment in Ruppert went further than just reserving a right to
appeal an adverse summary judgment ruling, as it also provided
for the plaintiff to reassert a voluntarily dismissed claim on
condition that a prior ruling be reversed on appeal.93 The court
recognized that its decision to dismiss the appeal for lack of
finality created a split with the Second Circuit.
There are compelling reasons for both strict as well as more
flexible interpretations and applications of the finality
requirement. This section’s discussion of the circuit splits begins
by providing factual background on Ruppert to illustrate the
circumstances in which issues of finality are raised with respect
to consent judgments. The discussion proceeds to the split
regarding finality following voluntary dismissals, and concludes
by detailing the split as to the permissibility of appeals from
conditional consent judgments that allow for litigation to
continue upon reversal and remand.
A.

Split One: Effect of Conditional Voluntary Dismissal on
Finality

In Ruppert, the Eighth Circuit held that a consent judgment
was not final, and thus not appealable, because it provided for a
voluntarily dismissed claim to “spring back to life” upon reversal
and remand.94 Joseph Ruppert, as trustee of the Fairmount Park
Inc. Retirement Savings Plan (“Fairmount Park”), a 401(k) plan,
brought suit against the plan’s service provider, Principal Life
Insurance Co. (“Principal”).95 Ruppert alleged that Principal
breached its fiduciary duty to the plan by receiving and failing to
90

Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a decision is
final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding a plaintiff’s potential to reassert a
dismissed claim in the event of remand).
91
See Ruppert, 705 F.3d at 842 (stating that because the consent agreement
provided for the plaintiff’s claim to “spring back to life,” the judgment was non-final).
92
705 F.3d 839.
93
Id. at 841.
94
Id. at 842.
95
Id. at 840.
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disclose the receipt of revenue-sharing funds and engaging in
other transactions prohibited by the Employee Retirement
Income Security (“ERISA”).96 After Ruppert moved to certify a
class comprised of trustees of similarly situated 401(k) plans
provided by Principal, the district court denied the motion.97
Following the denial of class certification, Ruppert proceeded
with the case on an individual basis.98 After determining the cost
of trial would be too substantial for a single plan’s claims,
Ruppert and Principal entered into a confidential settlement
agreement upon which Ruppert agreed to voluntarily dismiss
Fairmount Park’s individual claim in return for $80,000.99 The
parties jointly, and successfully, petitioned the court to enter a
consent judgment on those terms.100 The parties’ agreement and
the consent judgment expressly reserved Ruppert’s right to
appeal the denial of certification, providing that “the Trustee
explicitly reserves, on behalf of the Plan, his right to appeal the
Court’s denial of class certification.”101 The consent judgment
provided further that upon reversal, and subsequent class
certification on remand, Ruppert would be able to participate in
any eventual recovery of the class in excess of the $80,000
provided for by the parties’ agreement.102
Ruppert appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the
denial of class certification was an abuse of the district court’s
discretion.103 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding
that Ruppert’s individual claims had not been fully resolved since
he would be permitted to petition the district court for additional
recovery if the denial of certification was reversed and the case

96

Id. at 841.
Id. at 840. The court found that two of the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) were not satisfied. First, “that there are questions of law or
fact common to the class,” and second, “that the claims or defenses of the
representative party are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Id. at 841.
98
Id. at 840.
99
Id. at 841.
100
Id. at 840.
101
Id. at 841. Principal agreed that it would not take any position on appellate
jurisdiction, and thus, as the Eighth Circuit noted, on appeal “Principal [was] silent
on the question of jurisdiction.” Id. at 842.
102
Id. at 841. The consent judgment also provided the potential for Ruppert to
shift a percentage of the litigation costs he incurred to future class members. Id. at
841–42.
103
Id. at 842.
97
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remanded to the district court.104 The court cited Eighth Circuit
precedent that “rejected an attempt ‘to manufacture appellate
jurisdiction by crafting a stipulation in which [the appellant] tied
the fate of his remaining claim to the outcome of his appeal.’ ”105
The Eighth Circuit recognized that its holding conflicted
with a Second Circuit case, Purdy v. Zeldes,106 in which the
Second Circuit permitted appellate review despite the potential
for the plaintiff to reassert a claim upon reversal and remand.107
In Purdy, the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against his
former attorney regarding presentencing representation, alleging
three claims.108 After receiving adverse summary judgment
rulings on two of his claims and engaging in limited discovery,
Purdy decided his remaining claim was not worth pursuing by
itself.109 Purdy moved for, and was granted, dismissal of his
claim without prejudice, allowing for refiling of the claim only
upon reversal of the summary judgment on his other two
claims.110
On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that the final
judgment rule was not violated and that the case was
reviewable.111 In applying a relatively flexible interpretation of
finality, the Second Circuit supported its holding by stating that
104
Id. The class would, of course, have to be awarded damages for Ruppert to
seek a share of the recovery. However, it is not clear that class certification would be
required to shift some of the legal fees Ruppert incurred.
105
Id. at 842–43 (alteration in original) (quoting Clos v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 597
F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2010)). In case the court was “wrong about finality,” its
additional holding was that the consent judgment resolved Ruppert’s claim,
therefore leaving him with no personal stake in the case and rendering the case
moot. Id. at 843. The court also acknowledged that this backup holding created a
split with the D.C. Circuit. See Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding “no difference between those who voluntarily settle
individual claims and those who have their individual claims involuntarily
extinguished,” as long as the party maintained an interest in shifting expenses
related to the class action litigation). Further discussion of the backup mootness
holding and the circuit split it created is beyond the scope of this Note.
106
337 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit held that a decision is final
for purposes of appeal irrespective of a plaintiff’s potential to reassert a dismissed
claim in the event of remand, so long as the “plaintiff’s ability to reassert a claim is
made conditional on obtaining a reversal from [the court of appeals].” Id. at 258.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 257.
109
Id.
110
Id. One thing worth noting is that Purdy did not involve a consent judgment.
Rather, the court dismissed the remaining claim “without prejudice to refiling it if,
but only if, the dismissal of his first two claims was reversed on appeal.” Id.
111
Id. at 258.
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the final judgment rule was not implicated because the dismissed
claim could only be reasserted following a reversal, rather than
at the unfettered discretion of the plaintiff, and that upon
affirmance the case would come to an end.112 The court reasoned
that tying the reassertion of the claim to appellate reversal
“furthers the goal of judicial economy by permitting a plaintiff to
forgo litigation on the dismissed claim[] while accepting the risk
that if the appeal is unsuccessful, the litigation will end.”113
However, according to the court, when reassertion is not tied to a
reversal, the cost-benefit analysis is not nearly the same since
the court cannot determine what resources may be saved, even
upon an affirmance.114
Despite recognizing the Second Circuit’s holding, the Eighth
Circuit declined to follow it.115 Instead, the Eighth Circuit
applied a more strict view of finality. Notwithstanding the fact
that Ruppert’s dismissal of Fairmount Park’s individual claim
left nothing more for the district court to decide, the court held
that the potential for Ruppert’s claim to “spring back to life,”116
even if conditioned on a reversal, left Ruppert’s claims
unresolved and thus violated the final judgment rule.117
B.

Split Two: Effect of the Potential for Litigation To Continue
upon Reversal and Remand on the Appealability of Consent
Judgments

Next, it is appropriate to consider how a broader reading of
Ruppert’s holding—that a consent judgment that provides for
continued litigation upon reversal and remand is not a final
judgment for purposes of appeal—conforms with Fifth Circuit
precedent and conflicts with precedent of the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits.
The view that appeal from a conditional consent judgment is
prohibited is supported by the Fifth Circuit. In Amstar Corp. v.
Southern Pacific Transport Co. of Texas & Louisiana,118 the
112

Id.
Id. at 257–58.(quoting Chappelle v. Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652,
654 (2d Cir. 1996)).
114
See id. at 258.
115
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2013).
116
Id. at 842.
117
See id.
118
607 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). For Amstar’s facts, see supra
Introduction.
113
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parties agreed to a stipulation of facts and submitted a request to
the court to enter a consent judgment on the parties’ terms.119
The parties stipulated that Southern Pacific was liable and that
it would pay the damages determined by the court’s partial
summary judgment ruling.120 Despite the clear reservation of
Amstar’s right to appeal the determination of damages, the Fifth
Circuit dismissed an appeal from the consent judgment.121
Relying on its own precedent, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the
fact that both parties freely consented to the entry of a final
judgment precludes an appeal from it.”122 The Fifth Circuit
recently affirmed that review is precluded from a judgment that
both parties freely consent to.123
Arguably, the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ruppert and Fifth
Circuit precedent together stand for the proposition that appeal
from a consent judgment is not warranted—despite the consent
judgment’s reservation of the right to appeal—when the
judgment is entered with the actual consent of both parties and
would result in continued litigation at the trial level upon
reversal and remand.
While consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent, a broader
reading of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ruppert—that appeal
is prohibited from a conditional consent judgment in which
litigation will continue upon reversal and remand—conflicts with
established precedent in the Seventh and Eleventh circuits.124

119
Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 449 U.S. 924, 925 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120
Id. at 924–25.
121
See Amstar, 607 F.2d at 1100.
122
Id.
123
Jones v. Merck & Co. (In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.), 422 F. App’x. 315, 316
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming Amstar, 607 F.2d 1100).
124
Arguably, this broader reading with respect to the appealability of
conditional consent judgments also creates a split with the First and Third Circuits
which have held similar to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. See Keefe v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] party to a
consent decree or other judgment entered by consent may appeal from that decree or
judgment if it explicitly reserves the right to do so.”); BIW Deceived v. Local S6,
Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 828 (1st Cir.
1997) (“[A] party to a consent judgment is thereby deemed to waive any objections it
has to matters within the scope of the judgment . . . .” (quoting Coughlin v. Regan,
768 F.2d 468, 469–70 (1st Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However,
the First and Third Circuits’ precedents are not discussed further in this section to
avoid unnecessary repetition.
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Seventh Circuit Precedent

Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit supports
the view that appeals from conditional consent judgments are
permissible.125 After recognizing “a split among the circuits with
respect to whether a stipulated judgment may be appealed,”126
the Seventh Circuit soon answered in the affirmative in INB
Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc.127 INB Banking involved a
conversion action in which INB Banking Company (“INB Bank”)
sought to recover possession of two trucks that it had leased to a
third party, B&P Excavating, Inc., which traded the trucks to
Iron Peddlers.128 After the district court’s evidentiary ruling on a
motion in limine, Iron Peddlers was effectively left without a
defense.129 Iron Peddlers then consented to a judgment in favor
of INB Bank but specifically sought to reserve a right to appeal
the exclusion of evidence.130 Judgment was entered by the court
“without waiving the right of the defendant to appeal the
exclusion of the above evidence.”131 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit decided to adopt Eleventh Circuit precedent and “follow
the same rule”132 that “a party who consents to judgment while
explicitly reserving the right to appeal preserves that right.”133
The Seventh Circuit granted appeal despite the defendant’s
consent to the district court’s judgment, as well as the potential
for litigation to continue at the district court upon a reversal of
the exclusion of evidence.134
The Seventh Circuit affirmed INB Banking and “provid[ed] a
more complete explanation of the existence of appellate
jurisdiction over consent judgments that reserve a right of

125
INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a party to a consent decree or other judgment entered by consent may
appeal from that decree or judgment if that party explicitly reserves the right to do
so).
126
Hudson v. Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 922 F.2d 1306, 1312 (7th Cir.
1991).
127
993 F.2d 1291.
128
Id. at 1291.
129
Id. at 1292.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. (citing Shores v. Sklar, 885 F.2d 760, 764 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989)).
134
See id. at 1292.
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appeal”135 in Downey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.136 In
Downey, the Seventh Circuit explained that a consent judgment
that reserves a right to appeal does not constitute a waiver of,
but rather ensures the right to, appeal.137
In holding a
conditional consent judgment final, the court said that “for
jurisdictional purposes there is no distinction between ‘consent’
and ‘adversarial’ judgments . . . and any party can appeal as of
right from a final decision adverse to his interests.”138 The court
believed that distinguishing between judgments entered with the
consent of both parties and judgments entered against the wishes
of one party “would create an extra-statutory condition on
appeal.”139
2.

Eleventh Circuit Precedent

As the Seventh Circuit made clear by adopting the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule in INB Banking, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
are in agreement concerning the appealability of conditional
consent judgments. The Eleventh Circuit first confronted the
issue in Dorse v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.140 Dorse
A partial summary
involved a products liability claim.141
judgment determined that the defendant was not privy to a
government specification defense under applicable state law.142
Following the summary judgment ruling, the parties stipulated
to the entry of a consent judgment in favor of Dorse, but
expressly reserved the defendant’s right to appeal the summary
judgment ruling.143
The Eleventh Circuit contemplated how the terms of the
consent judgment impacted review of the case. The court noted
Fifth Circuit precedent from Amstar prohibiting appeals of this
nature; however, the court determined that given the
135
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S.
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *17.
136
266 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
137
Id. at 683 (“[A]n express reservation of the right to appeal avoids waiver of
contested issues that had been resolved earlier in the litigation.”).
138
Id. at 682.
139
Id.
140
798 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1986).
141
Id. at 1373.
142
Id. at 1374.
143
Id. at 1374–75. The rationale was that the defendant was willing to pay the
settled upon amount of damages, but only on condition that the partial summary
judgment be affirmed on appeal.
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stipulation’s clear recognition of the defendant’s right to appeal,
there was “no reason why that intent should be frustrated in this
case.”144
The Eleventh Circuit held this way despite the
possibility of continued litigation upon a reversal. In fact, a
review on the merits led to a reversal and remand to the district
court for further proceedings.145
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the Dorse court
granted appellate review because “the defendant expressly
reserved the right to appeal,” but distinguished the facts of the
case at hand in which the defendant did not reserve—and thus
the defendant was not entitled to—a right to appeal.146
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits are in agreement that
appeal from a conditional consent judgment is permissible, as
long as the judgment reserves a party’s right to appeal.147 This
proposition stands in stark contrast to the Fifth Circuit which
prohibits appeal from a judgment consented to by both parties.148
It also appears to be a split from a broader reading of the Eighth
Circuit’s holding in Ruppert, which prohibits appellate review
from a consent judgment despite an explicit reservation of the
right to appeal, because of the potential for litigation to continue
at the trial level on remand.149
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST STRICT REQUIREMENT OF
FINALITY FOR CONSENT JUDGMENTS
Hesitancy to grant appellate review—as displayed by the
Fifth Circuit and recently the Eighth Circuit—is rooted in strict
adherence to the requirement of finality.150
Yet, granting
review—as displayed by the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits—is based on more flexible and likely practical
application of the finality requirement.151
144

Id. at 1376–77.
Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 957, 958 (11th Cir. 1988).
146
Yunker v. Allianceone Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 701 F.3d 369, 374 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2012).
147
See supra Part II.B.1.
148
See supra Part II.B.
149
See supra Part II.B.
150
See, e.g., Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d
685, 688 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice, coupled with the intent to
refile the voluntarily dismissed claims after an appeal of the interlocutory order, is a
clear evasion of the judicial and statutory limits on appellate jurisdiction.”); see also
supra Part I.A.1.
151
See supra Parts II.A, II.B.1–2.
145
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Arguments for a Strict Requirement of Finality

The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ allegiance to the final
judgment rule is motivated by the policy of avoiding “piecemeal
litigation”152 and the rule that “[a] case is not to be sent up in
fragments.”153 Strict adherence to finality arguably achieves
three objectives: protecting the roles of trial and appellate courts,
ensuring smoother trials, and preserving scarce appellate
resources.154
First, a strict requirement of finality preserves the
traditional allocation of power between the district courts and the
circuit courts.155 The trial process facilitates effective appellate
review and thus helps ensure equitable results for the parties.156
Delayed appellate review protects a trial judge’s authority by
allowing efficient governance of trials as well as attaching
greater significance to district court rulings due to the inability
to review interlocutory orders.157 These benefits help a trial court
satisfy its primary obligations of fact finding, applying legal
standards, and ruling on procedural matters.158 Fulfillment of
these responsibilities benefits appellate courts by allowing them
to focus solely on important substantive issues and also receive a
well-developed record that presents these issues in a fuller
setting.159
Second, in addition to the relatively abstract notion of
preserving the functions of trial and appellate courts, a strict
requirement of finality allows trial proceedings to progress more
smoothly and efficiently.160 Courts often speak of “efficiency”
with respect to avoiding interference with and deliberate delay of
trial court proceedings by having unnecessary matters reviewed

152
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945); see also Fairbrook
Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 519 F.3d 421, 425 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“Despite our frequent warnings, many lawyers use this dismissal-without-prejudice
tactic to evade the statute limiting our appellate jurisdiction to the review of final
orders.”).
153
Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233–34 (quoting Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 147 U.S.
337, 341 (1893)).
154
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28.
155
See id. § 3907.
156
Id.
157
See id. § 3905.
158
Id. § 3907.
159
See id.
160
See id.

FINAL_ENGELHARDT

2015]

BRINGING MORE FINALITY TO FINALITY

10/7/2015 7:14 PM

315

on appeal.161 First and foremost, more efficient proceedings save
litigants time and money. Next, a smoother trial process helps
prevent the weakening of both testimonial and real evidence
from the passing of time as well as time lapses in trial
proceedings.162 Maintaining the strength and credibility of
evidence is crucial to avoiding prejudice to the jury and ensuring
the jury can perform its proper function.163 Finally, by delaying
review, issues may be resolved that could have resulted in
numerous interlocutory appeals.164 This delay in review allows
cases to be decided more quickly and brings about closure for
parties sooner.165 Avoiding these interlocutory appeals also
serves the third objective of finality—conserving appellate
resources.
Third, a strict concept of finality is vital to ensuring the most
efficient allocation of limited appellate resources. As the circuit
courts become more burdened—case filings rose four percent in
the federal circuit courts from 2011 to 2012166—less and less time
can be devoted to deciding more difficult cases correctly.167 With
less time allocated to difficult issues, less clearly articulated
rules presumably will follow. Consequently, district courts may
have trouble applying circuit court decisions correctly, which will
lead to more appeals and further strain on appellate resources.
This foreseeable problem supports relieving the burden on circuit
courts. In the context of consent judgments, this can be achieved
by denying appeals, or at most, applying the traditional waiver of

161
Id.; see also Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380
(1987) (“[T]he finality rule of § 1291 protects a variety of interests that contribute to
the efficiency of the legal system. Pretrial appeals may cause disruption, delay, and
expense for the litigants; they also burden appellate courts by requiring immediate
consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by the end of trial. In
addition, the finality doctrine protects the strong interest in allowing trial judges to
supervise pretrial and trial procedures without undue interference.”) Unnecessary
appellate lawmaking is also avoided. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907.
162
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
See id.
166
U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2012, USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2012
(last visited Aug. 23, 2015).
167
Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously,
95 YALE L.J. 62, 86 (1985).

FINAL_ENGELHARDT

316

10/7/2015 7:14 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:293

error standard of review.168 Doing so allows appellate courts to
shift resources from judgments entered with the consent of both
parties to nonconsensual judgments which intuitively involve
more dispute.169
B.

Arguments for a More Flexible Interpretation of Finality

On the other hand, two important considerations arguably
support a more flexible approach to the finality requirement in
regards to consent judgments: facilitating settlements and
conserving judicial resources.
Settlement remains a high priority in the federal court
system.170 In fact, district courts are granted a great deal of
flexibility to encourage settlements which are “viewed as an
efficient cure for the current backlog of cases and high costs of
litigation.”171
Traditionally, the settlement rate has been
recognized at about ninety-five percent of cases.172 Since a
substantial majority of cases are settled, settlement is the model
of civil litigation and provides a way to avoid the time and
expense involved in a court’s application of strict legal rules and
determinations of right and wrong.173
Further, settlement
generally provides the best outcome for plaintiffs, far exceeding
success at trial in which plaintiffs are successful in “less than 5
percent of filed cases.”174 Defendants also benefit by saving time
and money by settling the case and may also protect their
reputation and image, something important to companies and
individuals alike. In addition to benefitting parties, settlement
ultimately benefits the federal judicial system which would
collapse without settlements serving to contain the district
courts’ workload.

168
Zitko, supra note 55, at 247–48. This standard subjects conditional consent
judgments to a de facto rule of non-appealability. See supra Part I.B.
169
See Zitko, supra note 55, at 247–48.
170
Id. at 261; see U.S. District Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.us
courts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-district-courts.aspx (last visited Feb.
24, 2014).
171
Zitko, supra note 55, at 261 (footnote omitted).
172
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009).
173

WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907. Time is also saved on other aspects of
a trial including jury selection.
174
Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 172, at 112–13.
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Granting appeals on the merits from conditional consent
judgments facilitates settlement by providing leverage in
negotiations. When one party seeks to reserve a right to appeal,
the other party essentially allows “a speedier and less costly road
to appellate review” by consenting to an express reservation in
the consent judgment.175 As a result, the consenting party has
“greater bargaining power in fashioning the terms of
settlement.”176 Similarly, a willingness to dispense with the right
to appeal also provides a party with bargaining power in
settlement discussions.
First, a party set on reserving a right to appeal will likely be
willing to agree to a lower settlement amount. This scenario
benefits both parties. One party is able to secure review of a
ruling that is generally detrimental to the case and that one feels
was decided incorrectly, while the other party receives the
benefit of paying relatively less with the reasonable assurance
that district court rulings are affirmed on appeal in the vast
majority of cases.177 A party wishing to secure appellate review
would be motivated to agree to a relatively low settlement
because the alternative means of securing a right to
appeal—litigating to final judgment—would involve great time
and expense.
On the other hand, a party may be able to secure more
favorable settlement terms by offering to forgo, rather than
reserve, the right of appeal. The ability to secure appellate
review in a consent judgment may benefit settlement
negotiations, even if the right is not reserved. For example, had
settlement talks in Ruppert reached a stalemate, the plaintiff
could have offered to dispense with his right to review of the
denial of class certification, and thus his right to seek further
relief from the defendant. Dispensing with this right, and thus
not reserving a right to appeal, would have provided the
defendant with certainty regarding its liability to the Fairmount
Park fund—allowing more certainty in its financial planning
going forward—and would also have saved the time, expense,
and loss of reputation associated with fighting the claim on
175

Zitko, supra note 55, at 262.
Id.
177
See Table B-1—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics
(March 31, 2012), USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B01Mar12.pdf.
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appeal. Consequently, a defendant may be willing to agree to a
higher payout, thus helping the parties overcome an impasse in
negotiations. Just how much leverage the plaintiff in Ruppert, or
similarly situated parties, would have by offering to exclude a
right to appeal from a consent judgment would likely depend on
factors such as the party’s confidence in obtaining a reversal as
well as its willingness to incur the opportunity costs associated
with bringing an appeal.178
Next, facilitating appeal through a more flexible
interpretation of finality promotes judicial economy. Judicial
economy is a broad principle that the limited resources of the
judicial system or a specific court should be efficiently managed
and conserved.179 The truth is that a very large majority of
district court decisions are affirmed on appeal.180 In 2012, for
example, only 6.7% of district court decisions were reversed on
appeal.181 Although conditional consent judgments may lead to
continued litigation at the district court level, the rate of reversal
ensures that this scenario will be quite limited. Further, it is
likely that the resources expended on continued litigation on
remand would be heavily outweighed by the resources saved by
avoiding the motion practice and litigation that would otherwise
be required to reach final judgment. Therefore, it is likely that in
the aggregate, “whenever a party is willing to forego fully
litigating its case at the district court level . . . to have a chance
at getting certain findings reversed on appeal,” judicial resources
will be conserved.182
To understand how judicial resources are conserved, consider
a claim that a plaintiff prefers not to litigate as an individual
claim after receiving adverse rulings on her two other claims.183
This plaintiff may be willing to voluntarily dismiss the claim
through a consent judgment and risk abdication of the claim
upon affirmance, in exchange for a speedier road to appeal. If

178
These opportunity costs include the time, money, and other resources that
could be devoted elsewhere—something especially important when a plaintiff is
suing multiple parties.
179
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 975 (10th ed. 2014).
180
See Table B-1—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics
(March 31, 2012), USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B01Mar12.pdf.
181
Id.
182
Zitko, supra note 55, at 262.
183
See Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2003).
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this cost-benefit analysis with respect to securing appeal is not
available, it may not be worth it for the plaintiff to dismiss the
claim. Consequently, the plaintiff may litigate the individual
claim by itself and then seek appellate review regarding her two
other claims. That scenario seems to involve unnecessary time
and costs, which is especially troubling when considered on a
larger scale involving many similarly situated plaintiffs.
IV. SOLUTION
A clear split in authority exists with respect to finality
regarding conditional voluntary dismissals as well as the
appealability of consent judgments that reserve a right to appeal.
Despite noting the conflicting views of other circuits, the Eighth
Circuit appeared to have no intention of revisiting its position on
these issues in Ruppert, and it is likely that other circuits will do
the same when confronting similar finality issues.184 Further, it
remains unclear how circuits with limited or no exposure to these
issues may decide.185
A uniform approach will help resolve these discrepancies.
The result should be a rule requiring appellate courts to
recognize an express reservation of a right to appeal in a consent
judgment, including in consent judgments in which reasserting a
claim is conditioned on a reversal. This approach would combine
Second Circuit precedent regarding appealability following
conditional voluntary dismissals and precedent from both the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits regarding the appealability of
consent judgments which reserve a right to appeal.
Four primary arguments support a solution to this effect.
First, a uniform standard recognizing the right to appeal would
provide transparency for courts and parties to settlement
negotiations and thus further a consent judgment’s facilitation of
settlements. Second, it would promote judicial economy. Third,
the solution would not violate the final judgment rule. Fourth,
and finally, past flexibility in interpreting the limits of statutory
appellate jurisdiction support adopting the solution.
184
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S.
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *25.
185
For instance, will other circuits decide similarly to the Seventh Circuit and
adopt another circuit’s more flexible rule, or will they decide similarly to the Eighth
Circuit and adhere to longstanding precedent within their respective circuit
supporting a strict adherence to finality?
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Providing Certainty and Facilitating Settlement

First, a uniform rule would provide courts and parties with
more certainty and thus promote settlements. A current issue is
that parties cannot be certain whether a reservation of a right to
appeal in a consent judgment will be recognized. For example,
Third Circuit precedent on the appealability of consent
judgments has been very inconsistent. The Third Circuit has at
times applied an even more liberal approach than the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits by considering the intent of the parties
rather than requiring a right to appeal to be explicitly reserved
in the consent judgment; yet, at other times the Third Circuit has
applied a strict requirement of finality by denying appeal despite
express reservation of a right to appeal in the consent
judgment.186
Assurance that a right to appeal will be recognized “will
make all parties clearly aware of their respective rights under a
consent judgment,” and will help avoid the type of inconsistency
in the Third Circuit that limits the effectiveness of conditional
consent judgments.187 While negotiating, parties will be certain
how the appellate court will interpret the right to appeal and
what precedent it will apply. A consistent, predictable standard
will allow parties to negotiate at arm’s length without
speculation or uncertainty and to focus their concerns on arriving
at speedy and equitable outcomes.
While assurance of how conditional consent judgments will
be treated on appeal will likely be beneficial, it may be argued
that the assurance should be that a right to appeal will be
forfeited, rather than reserved. First, it may be in a party’s best
interest to settle an issue once and for all rather than taking a
risk by accepting a lesser payout in return for expediting appeal.
Not having the ability to appeal as an option will force parties to
act rationally and make sure to secure agreements that are in
their best interest. Second, negotiating over the reservation or
186

Compare Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d
Cir. 2000) (granting review because it was the parties’ intent to reserve a right of
appeal, despite not explicitly doing so), and Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs.,
Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 176–77, 182 (3d Cir. 2004) (permitting review even when “[t]he
intention to appeal was not included in the stipulation” and litigation would
continue at the district level upon remand), with Verzilli v. Flexon, Inc., 295 F.3d
421, 424–25 (3d Cir. 2002) (denying review despite an explicit reservation of the
right to appeal because litigation would continue in the district court upon reversal).
187
Zitko, supra note 55, at 263.
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abdication of the right to appeal may actually derail negotiations.
With all of the considerations that go into the determination of
whether to pursue or forgo an appeal—such as the chances of
success on appeal and the willingness to expend the resources to
bring the appeal—negotiations may become more complicated.
Therefore, negotiating over the reservation or forfeit of a right to
appeal may actually prolong discussions as well as lead to an
impasse, rather than help overcome one.
Notwithstanding these contentions, it is clear that direction
is needed and it seems that a standard of recognizing appeals
would be most beneficial. Despite the potential to prolong the
final resolution of a case and to derail settlement talks,
settlements would be encouraged by allowing appeal for two
reasons. First, many consent judgments are entered because of
the potential to reserve a right to appeal. Without being able to
reserve such a right, parties may forgo entering a stipulation.
Second, as discussed earlier, reserving a right to appeal presents
important leverage in settlement negotiations.188
A party
persistent on reserving a right to appeal is more likely to agree to
a relatively low settlement amount, while a party wishing for the
other party to forgo appeal is more likely to agree to a relatively
high settlement amount.
B.

Promoting Judicial Economy

Second, a uniform rule recognizing the reservation of a right
to appeal and to also reassert claims upon reversal would
promote judicial economy. It is true that, in an initial sense,
denying appeals from consent judgments would save appellate
judicial resources.189 However, the inability to bring an appeal
may lead to a decrease in consent judgments and thus increased
time spent adjudicating cases at the district court level.190
Further, an increase in the number of cases litigated to final
judgment may lead to an increase in requests for appellate
review.191
It may be argued that judicial resources will not be
conserved in the aggregate, because upon reversal, remand, and
further litigation at the trial level, more resources will have been
188
189
190
191

See supra Part III.B.
Zitko, supra note 55, at 261.
Id.
Id.
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expended, which is a major issue raised in opposition to
interlocutory appeals. Appellants face little downside to a purely
interlocutory appeal because even if the appeal is unsuccessful,
they remain in the same position that they would have been in
had the appeal been prohibited.192
However, there is an
important distinction with respect to purely interlocutory appeals
and conditional consent judgments. In the case of conditional
consent judgments, because a judgment has been entered, the
case ends upon affirmance of the judgment.193 The fact that the
case ends upon affirmance protects against “an abusive appellant
attempting to appeal each minor issue in a case.”194 This is
something that generally cannot be avoided with purely
interlocutory appeals in which the case continues at the trial
level following affirmance or denial.
Further, a clear requirement that a right to appeal must be
reserved to secure appeal will benefit both trial and appellate
judges.
Trial judges will know what language a consent
judgment must contain and will not waste time determining first,
whether appeal will be granted, and second, what procedures are
required to secure review. Appellate courts will also save time by
not looking beyond the terms of the judgment and to the intent of
the parties.195 Further, a consistent standard will avoid the need
for appellate courts to determine where they stand on the
issue—including reviewing their respective precedent as well as
other courts’ precedent and determining which to follow.
Although there may be instances when an appellate court
has to hear an appeal it may not otherwise have to allocate
resources to, or a district court has to continue proceedings upon
remand, a rule allowing for appeal from consent judgments
expressly reserving the right to appeal will likely promote
judicial economy. Judicial economy would be promoted because
the rule would encourage parties to forego needless trial court
litigation, there is a high likelihood of affirmance and thus an
ending of the case, it would safeguard against abusive appeals of
insignificant issues, and benefit trial and appellate judges.

192

Id. at 262.
Id.
194
Id.
195
See, e.g., Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d
Cir. 2000) (granting review because it was the parties’ intent to reserve a right of
appeal, despite not explicitly doing so).
193
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Remaining Faithful to the Final Judgment Rule

Third, the proposed solution would not weaken the final
judgment rule. The only way a dismissed claim could be
reasserted is if the parties return to the trial court on remand
following a reversal by the appellate court. In that case, because
of the remand, the case would not have been fully resolved
anyway.196 The argument can be made, as discussed above, that
Congress has made its intent concerning appellate jurisdiction
clear and consequently, expediting appeal in a way not explicitly
provided by statue is a run around of Congress’s intent.197
However, it is important to consider that finality jurisprudence
has involved statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court. The
collateral order doctrine, for instance, is a product of the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the interlocutory appeals
provision of § 1292 and finality requirement of § 1291.198
Similarly, the Supreme Court can provide clarity on conditional
consent judgments, not by rewriting the final judgment rule, but
by articulating that conditional consent judgments fit within
§ 1291’s requirement of a final judgment because these
judgments resolve all outstanding issues and leave nothing for
the trial court to decide.199 In fact, these judgments fit squarely
into the traditional definition of a final judgment—one that “ends
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.”200
D. Past Flexibility
Finally, we have seen flexibility in applying the finality
requirement. For example, the Second Circuit permits appeal
following a voluntarily dismissal of a claim despite the ability to
reassert the claim upon reversal.201 Along the same lines, there
have been numerous rule changes with respect to appellate
jurisdiction including the adoption and eventual abandonment of
196
Brief for Appellant at 17–18, Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-7468), 2002 WL 32487715, at *17–18.
197
See supra Part I.A.1.
198
See id.
199
See supra Part I.B.
200
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
201
Purdy, 337 F.3d at 258. The Second Circuit held that a decision is final for
purposes of appeal irrespective of a plaintiff’s potential to reassert a dismissed claim
in the event of remand, so long as the “plaintiff’s ability to reassert a claim is made
conditional on obtaining a reversal from [the court of appeals].” Id.
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the “death knell” doctrine which permitted interlocutory appeals
following the denial of class certification.202 Thus, further
flexibility should be permitted to help promote the “efficient
administration of justice in the federal courts.”203
CONCLUSION
It is clear that a uniform approach is needed in the context of
conditional consent judgments because “[t]here is, still, too little
finality about ‘finality.’ ”204 As established above, the right to
appeal from a consent judgment is not only a central issue in
cases involving denials of class certification, such as Ruppert, but
also in a wide range of cases concerning a variety of issues.205 A
rule that combines Second Circuit precedent with that of the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits,206 allowing appellate review from
consent judgments that expressly reserve a right to appeal as
well as the reassertion of claims upon a reversal, would provide
stability in a very practical area of the law while serving the
interests of the federal judiciary and litigants alike.
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WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S.
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *1.
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Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 556 F.3d 164, 172 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942)).
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–29, Ruppert, 134 S. Ct. 152 (No. 12-1425)
at *28–29; see also supra Part II.
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Precedent concerning appellate jurisdiction with respect to conditional
voluntary dismissals and precedent regarding conditional consent judgments,
respectively.
203

